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N the State of California between 1910 and 1929,six thousand and fifty-five operations have been
performed in public institutions of the state
designed to prevent reproduction of the human
species. Approximately three thousand such opera-
tions have been performed in other states during
the same period. Generally speaking this practice
has been carried on under the express provisions of
statutes permitting voluntary sterilizations in some
cases and requiring compulsory sterilizations in
others. The operations most frequently used for
this purpose are that of vasectomy as applied to
males and salpingectomy as applied to females. We
are assured by the members of the medical profes-
sion who have developed these techniques that, un-
like castration and spaying, vasectomy and sal-
pingectomy do not desexualize the individual or
produce other physical or mental changes except
such as may grow out of a realization that the child-
producing function has been destroyed. The con-
stitutionality of statutes providing for the steriliza-
tion of the unfit has been established in a number
of states and by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The courts have been more reluctant about
conceding the constitutionality of statutes provid-
ing for the sterilization of criminals.'
In most of the statutes which provide for the
sterilization of the unfit in state institutions, there
have been incorporated provisions, absolving from
civil and criminal liability, those who perform such
operations. As yet, none of these provisions have
been passed upon by courts of review. Presumably,
in order to avoid liability, the provisions of the
statutes must be strictly complied with.
We have no records to reveal the number of
operations for sterilization which are performed in
private practice. That the number is large, there
seems to be no doubt. As to the nature of cases in
which such private operations are performed, stu-
dents of the eugenic phases of sterilization declare
that persons with physical defects furnish most of
them. For instance, in California, a large number
of sterilizations among women are the result of
tuberculosis. Defective organs such as hearts,
livers, or kidneys, which would be apt to fail in the
emergency of childbearing, provide the incentive of
;Full title of paper is "Civil and Criminal Liability of Physicians
for Sterilization Operations."
1. For a full discussion of the law involved in the preceding
introductory paragraphs see, "The Law and Human Sterilization" by
Otis H. Castle, 53 Reports of Am. Bar Assn. 556.
others. Ordinarily the purpose is therapeutic2
rather than eugenic, nevertheless there are cases of
voluntary private sterilizations where the purpose
is to cut off a strain of defective germ-plasm, as in
the case of a diagnosis of hereditary insanity or in
case of the marriage of two persons each with a pro-
nounced family history of cancer. We may safely
assume, no doubt, that in some cases the purpose of
the operation is merely to remove danger of preg-
nancy.
Whatever the motive may be which inspires
such an operation and whatever the purpose wI h
is designed to be served, the increasing number of
such operations, both in public institutions and in
private practice, suggests the importance of de-
termining the civil and criminal liability, if any
there be, of physicians who perform them.
Criminal Liability
An operation for sterilization would clearly re-
sult in criminal liability in many cases. Death re-
sulting from such a cause, if no justification or
excuse were present, would make the perpetrator
guilty of a homicide, varying in degree according
to the malice and intent in his mind at the time of
the act. It is unnecessary to carry our inquiry
further on this point. The usual considerations in
determining liability for homicide would be perti-
nent here. Gross negligence, general criminal in-
tent, the fact of being engaged in the commission
of another felony, might each be sufficient to supply
the element of intent The main consideration
would be that of causation, and death resulting.
In similar manner such an operation might
result in liability for mayhem or maiming. This
would be clearly true in case of castration because
the effect of the operation is to change the entire
physical character of the individual. 4  In its earlier
development the crime of mayhem was defined as
2. A distinction between eugenical and therapeutic purposes is
important under some of the sterilization statutes. (See notes 25. 26,
27, 28 infra.) "Medical" and "therapeutic" are probably synonymous.(See Williams v. Scudder, 102 Ohio State 305, 131 N. E. 481, 483;
Gould Med. Diet. (2d ed) p. 1380).
3. Gross Negligence. See note 61 L. R. A. 287, 289. See also
State v. Reynolds, 42 Kan. 320, 22 Pac. 410, 16 Am. St. Rep. 483
(1889) and note; State v. IHardister, 38 Ark. 605, 42 Am. Rep. 5 (1882).
General Criminal Intent. Clark and Marshall Crimes (3d ed)
See. 243; State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 95 Am. Dec. 776 (18.88); State
v. Lodge, 9 Houst (Del) 542, 33 Atl. 312 (1892).
Homicide in Commission of Felony. 1 Hale P. C. 473; 21 Mich.
L. Rev. 9,5. See Clark and Marshall Crimes (3d. ed) 195, and eases
collected in 63 L. R. A. 353. At present, Utah is the only state which
makes an unlawful sterilization operation a felony. (See note 32 infra.).
In two states unlawful sterilization operations are misdemeanors
(notes 30, 31 infra.). Homicide in commission of misdemeanor (63
L. R. A. 379 et seq.).
4. Castration: Bouvier Law Dirt. I Hawk P. C. 107; Bishop
Crim. Law (9th ed.) Sec. 1001.
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"when one shall diminish the strength of another's
body and weaken him thereby to get his own living
and by that means the commonwealth is deprived
of the use of one of her members."5  It was some-
times said that the gist of the offense consisted in
the fact that the injured person was less able to
fight or to defend himself.6
In cases both of homicide and mayhem, even
the consent of the person castrated would not serve
to excuse the physician, for it is clearly established
that consent of the injured person in this type of
case does not operate to prevent criminal liability.
7
The rule was well stated by Stephen in his History
of English Criminal Law as follows: "No one has
the right to consent to the infliction upon himself
of death or any injury likely to cause death except
in cases of necessary medical operations from which
death might result, or to consent to the infliction
upon himself of bodily harm amounting to a maim,
for any purpose injurious to the public."8  This rule
has been generally followed in the United States."
Similar provisions are commonly found in the stat-
utes governing operations to produce abortions.'
Although no case has been found at the common
law where a physician was held criminally liable for
performing a castration operation upon a person
with his consent, nevertheless criminal. liability
would seem to be certain in such a case in view of
the gist and scope of the crime of mayhem and the
attitude of the law toward the effect of consent in
such cases. Of course justification or excuse might
appear from the facts of the particular case which
would absolve the surgeon from criminal liability."
An interesting subject of inquiry is opened up
when we attempt to apply these principles of law to
the modern sterilization operations of vasectomy
and salpingectomy As has been pointed out already
they are entirely different from the cruel and de-
spoiling operations known to the common law. It
is true that in at least one recent case the use of the
modern operations was condemned as constituting
cruel and unusual punishment.12  This decision
would seem to have resulted from a misunderstand-
ing of the nature and effect of these operations.'
Under the provisions of the common law, vasectomy
5. Bishop Criminal Law, (9th. ed) See. 1001, quoting from an
old authority, Poulton.
6. I Hawk. P. C. 107; 1 Inst. 107 a, b, in Stephen's Digest
(7th ed.) 290.
7. See People v. Clough 17 Wendell 351, 31 Am. Dee. S0S (1837)
for a full discussion, and kex v. Wright, I East P. C. 896. Co.
Litt. 127a.In abortion cases where death results, the homicide is not justifiable.State v. Magnell, 3 Penn. (Del) 307, 51 Al. 606 (1901); State v. Moore,
99 Iowa 128, 95 Am. Dec. 776 (1868). The same is true where death
is the result of a duel. Regina v. Barronet, Dears C. C. 51.8. Stephen Digest of the Criminal Law, Art 291. See JournalSocial Hygiene, Vol. 14. No. 3 (March, 1928). Other uses of castration
in history, see Sterilization for Human Betterment, by E. S. Gosney
and Paul Popenoe, Ch. 2 (1929).9. Wharton Cr. Law. (11th Ed) Sec. 1892; Clark and MarshallCrimes (3d. ed.) Sec. 150. See People v. Clough 17 Wend 351, 31 Am.
Dec. 30a (1837). See notes 7 and 10.10. Abortions committed by the pregnant woman upon herself
are punished in most of the state statutes. Cal. Penal Code, Sec. 275;Bender'a N. Y. P. C. 198, See. 81; State v. Carey 7,6 Conn. 342,56 Atl. 62 (1904). So the consent of the woman is not a defense.
State v. Carey supra; State v. Magnell 19 Del. 307, 51 Atl. 006(1901); Barrow v. State 121 Ga. 187, 48 S. K. 950 (1904); State v.
Moore 295 Ia 128, 95 Am. Dec. 776 (1868); People v. Abbott, 116
Mich. 203, 74 N. W. 529 (1898); Willingham v. State 33 Tex. Cr. 98,25 S. W. 424 (1894); Smith v. State 33 Me. 48, 54 Am. Dec. 007(1851).
11. justification or excuse would be material in showing an absence
of wilfsulness or malice under the mayhem statutes. Bowers v. State,
24 Tex. App. 5942, 7 S. W. 247, 5 Am. St. Rep. 901 (1888); High v.
State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 10 S. W. 23, 8 Am. St. Rep. 488 (1888).
(See note 60 infra.).
12. Hendricks v. Mickle, 262 Fed. 677, D. C. D. Nev. 1918;
Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413, D. C. S. D. Iowa 191.. See also
dissenting opinion in Smith v. Command 231 Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 140,
142 (1925).
13. "From the standpoint of pain it is comparable to the extraction
of a tooth," Castle, Human Sterilization and the Law. See majority
opinion in Smith v. Command, supra nt. 12.
and salpingectomy could hardly constitute mayhem.
The elements of "rendering one less able to defend
himself" or -to "fight for the king" or "less able
to earn his own living" are not results of the opera-
tions as they are now performed.' 4  Unless the
courts could find in the common law definitions of
the crime of mayhem something to indicate that it
was intended to include a prohibition of operations
Which produced merely an inability to procreate,
then there would seem to be no basis for fixing a
criminal liability.
Practically all of the states have incorporated
into their codes definitions of the crime of mayhem.
Under these statutes, the crime is much broader
than at -common law." The elements of the crime
as outlined in these statutes differ considerably.
Many require an intent to maim.' Two make a
"premeditated design" a special element of 'the
offense.'7 Some apparently have departed entirely
from the concept of the common law and make the
crime consist in the unlawful and malicious removal
of a member of a human being or the disabling or
disfiguring thereof or rendering it useless.'8 The
operations of vasectomy and salpingectomy would
render useless the procreative organs, in the sense
that they would be no longer useful for purpose of
procreation. For the gratification of sex desires.19
for satisfying the law as to potency,2° for commit-
ting the crime of rape,2' they would still be useful.
In each case the answer might vary according to
the point of view of the patient or of the judge.
If the consent of the person were given, it is
probable under present day statutes that there
would be no liability for mayhem, for consent given
would usually warrant the conclusion that malice, a
necessary element of the crime, was not present in
the mind of the physician. This would not neces-
sarily follow, however, for malice on the part of the
operator may exist concurrently with consent on
the part of the patient.23
No case has been found of much value to the
instant discussion for, out of the nine cases' 3 reach-
ing the appellate courts of the various states in
which mayhems were committed by injuries to the
private parts of the male or female, not a single
one of the acts complained of was accomplished
with the consent of the sufferer. Most of the cases
involved castrations. The only one of these cases
which approach the problem of the liability of a
14. Sterilization produces no change in the sexual life; no organs
or glands are removed; no feelings are altered. Sterilization for Human
Betterment, p. 21.
15. Mere disfigurement was not mayhem at common law. East
Crown Law 393; Terrel v. State, 86 Tenn. 533, 8 S. W. 212 (1898).
Statutes have included many new inflictions unknown to the common
law, State v. Sheldon, 54 Mont. 195, 169 Pac. 37 (1917).
16. U. S. v. Scroggins, Fed. Cas. 1.6243 (1847); State v. Hair,
17 inn. 351, 34 N. W. 893 (1887); High v. State, 26 Tex App. 545,
10 S. W. 238, 8 Am. St. Rep. 488 (1888).
17. See note L. R. A. 1916 E 494.
18. Kitchens v. State, 80 Ga. 810, 7 S. E. 209 (1888). A typical
mayhem statute is Cal. Pen Cd. Sec. 203. See People v. Wright, 93
Cal. 564, 29 Par. 240 (1893); State v. Bunyard, 253 Mo. 347, 161
S. W. 75 (1913).
19. Sterilization for Human Betterment, supra., p. 29.
20. Want of power for copulation is impotence; but mere sterility
is not. Turner v. Avery, 92 N. 3. Eq. 473, 113 At. 710 (1921). See
also Griffeth v. Griffeth 162 Ill. 368, 44 N. E. 820 (1896); Kirschbaum
v. Kirsehbaum, 92 N. 1. Eq. 7, 111 Atl. 697 (19-20). (Anonymous 89
Ala. 291, 7 So. 100, 18 Am. St. Rep. 116, 7 1- R. A. 4295 (1890); Payne
v. Payne, 46 Minn. 467, 49 N. W. 280, 24 Am. St. Rep. 240 (1891).
21. Well illustrated by Rudd J., in In re Thomson, 103 Misc Rep
23, 169 N. Y. S. 638, 643 (1918).
12. See notes 4, 5, supra. Note L. R. A. 1916 E. 494, 497. See
also Green v. State 151 Ala. 14, 44 So. 194, 125 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1907).
13. Daggs v. State, 15 Oka. Cr. Rep. 127, 175 Pac. 266, (1918);
Choate v. Comm., 176 Ky. 427, 195 So. W. 1080, (1917); State v.
Sheldon, 51 Mont. 185, 168 Par. 37, (1917); Col. v. State, 62 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 270, 138 S. W. 109 (1911); People v. Schoedde, 126 Cal. 873,
58 Pac. 859 (1899); Kitchens v. State, 88 Ga. 810, 7 S. E. 209 (1888);
State v. Fry, 67 Iowa 475, 25 N. W. 738 (1885); Worley v. State,
11 Humph. (Tenn.) 172 (1890); Moore v. State, 4 Chand. (Wis.)
16S, 3 Pinney 373 (1851).
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physician is the California case in which conspira-
tors hired a veterinary surgeon to perform the op-
eration.2" In these cases, which involve the use of
force and violence upon the complaining witness to
effect the operation, we have nothing comparable to
a private operation for sterilization by a physician
according to modern methods and with consent.
In recent years a few of the states which have
adopted sterilization statutes have incorporated
therein two types of prohibitory provisions with
regard to the performance of non-therapeutic pri-
vate operations of sterilization.
First, the statutes of Indiana, 5 Utah,26 Mis-
sissippi,2 7 and Virginia, 28 make the following pro-
vision for therapeutic operations of sterilization:
"Noting in this, act shall be construed so, as to pre-
vent the medical or surgical treatment for sound therapeutic
reasons of any person in this state, by a physician or sur-
geon licensed in this state which treatment may incident-
ally involve the nullification or destruction of the reproduc-
tive functions."
The Indiana statute makes a further qualifica-
tion, "provided that such treatment shall be that
which is recognized as legal and approved after due
process of law."
It will be noted that this type of provision does
not make such operation a criminal offense, and no
punishment is provided. It is probably at most a
provision designed to avoid civil liability except
where the operation is non-therapeutic, or possibly
even where the physician is unlicensed, or the op-
eration "primarily" (as distinguished from "incident-
ally") involves the nullification or destruction of
the reproductive functions. If the operation did
contain any of the above impliedly prohibited
circumstances, an attorney might well hesitate to
advise a physician that he might safely perform the
operation in a state which had such a statute.
Especially would this be true in Indiana.
2
1
Second, in three states, Iowa,"0 Kansas,31 and
Utah,32 a direct penal provision is found:
"Except as authorized by this act" (the act refers to
the sterlization of the unfit in state institutions,) "every
person who shall perfortn, encourage, assist in, or other-
wisei promote the performance of either of the operations"(vasectomy and salpingectomy) 'for the purpose of de-
stroying the powers of procreation, unless performance of
such operation is a medical necessity, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanOr."
Utah is the only state which incorporates in its
acts both of the above provisions. The Michigan
sterilization act of 1913 contained substantially the
second provision, but the act was held to be uncon-
stitutional on account of other provisions therein
contained and when it was reenacted in 1923 and
amended in 1925, the provision was omitted.
33
In those states which have penal provisions
regulating liability for performance of such opera-
tions without therapeutic or medical justification, 4
liability is determined thereby. Where the state
has nothing but a mayhem statute Which follows
24. People v. Schoedde, 12-6 Cal. 373, 58 Pac. 859 (1899).
2i. Indiana Stats. 1927, Ch. 241, Sec. 6.
26. Utah Stats. 1925, Ch. 82, Sec. 6.
27. Mississippi Stats. 1928, Ch. 294, Sec. 6.
28. Virginia Ann. Code 1924, Ch. 46b, Sec. 1095m, (p. 569).
29. Indiana is one of the states in which consent to an abortion
is not a bar to civil recovery against the physician by the patient
(See note 46, infra.).
S0. Iowa Stats. 1924. Code of Iowa 1927. Ch. 168. See. 8264.
When originally passed in 1915 the section was 2600s (5).
81. Kansas Stats. 1917, Chap. 299, Sec. 7. Revised Stats 1923.
Chap. 76, Sec. 177.
82. Utah Laws of 1925, Chap. 82, Sec. 7.
33. The original Michigan statute enacted in 1913 is found in
the Comp. Laws 1915, Ch. 96, See. 5180 (5). The new act which
omitted the penal provision is found in Stats. 1923, Act 285, Sec. 2,
as amended in 1925, Act 71.
34. See note 2 supra.
the common law concept, it is very doubtful if the
modern operations for sterilization could be classed
as criminal. Where the statute speaks in terms
of "rendering useless" a member or organ of a
human being, there is possibility of a decision either
denying or establishing liability. In any event
malice seems to be an element essential to criminal
liability in such a case.
Even though the physician be not guilty of
mayhem, under settled rules of criminal law, if the
operation were performed without the patient's
consent, it would constitute a criminal assault;"
likewise if the patient submitted to the operation
but was incapable of giving legal consent."8 If con-
sent were given there would be no liability for an
assault and battery,17 unless of course the act
amounted to a breach of the peace,38 which would
be improbable.
Civil Liability
The question of the civil liability of the physi-
cian for a privately performed sterilization opera-
tion presents an equally interesting problem.
Naturally the question is not so difficult where the
plaintiff has given his or her consent to the opera-
tion as where it has been performed by force and
violence, thus constituting an assault and battery
under the general principles of the law of torts.3 "
Although there are a number of cases involving
operations which incidentally resulted in the nulli-
fication of the reproductive functions, 4 not a single
reported case has been found in which a person who
has -consented to a sterilization operation 'has
brought suit against the physician. For lack of
precedents we are forced to consider analogous
situations in the law of torts and to indulge in
speculation as to the principles of public policy
which may be involved.
We may draw an analogy between the case of
an illegal sterilization operation and an illegal
abortion, for the courts would undoubtedly treat
them in the same class, both illegal operations, pro-
hibited, except in case of therapeutic necessity. Ap-
pellate courts of this country have considered nine
cases of abortions where suit was brought by or
for one who had consented to the operation. In
four of the jurisdictions, Federal, 4' Kentucky,4 2
Massachusetts, 4 3 and New York,4 4 no recovery was
allowed, on the principle that an illegal transaction
cannot be made the basis of an action by one who
is a party thereto. In five of the jurisdictions, Ala-
bama," Indiana, 46 Maine,4t Ohio,
48 
and Wisconsin, 49
recovery was allowed on the theory that "because
of the state's interest, neither party has a right to
35. 1 lanwk, P. C. c. 15, Sec. 2.
36. Clark and Marshall Crimes Sec. 219 (3rd Ed.) See also
a short discussion on the Right of Sterilization in (1929) 73 Sol.
our. 258.
37. State v. Beck, I Hill (S. C.) 363, 26 Am. Dec. 190 (1833).
38. Commonwealth v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350, 20 Am. Rep. 328
(1876).
39. Mohr v. Williams. 95 Minn. 261, 104, N. W. 12, 111 Am
St. Rep. 462, 1 L. R. A. (NS) 439 (1905) and note. See also note 26
A. L. R. 1036; 2 Cal. L. Rev. 312; and Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla.
572, 187 Pac. 196, (1914).
40. In Wells v. VanNort 100 Ohio St. 101, 125 N. E. 910 (1919);
Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 224 II. 300. 7 L. R. A. (NS) 609,
78 iN. E. 562 (1906); King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 294 Pac. 270
(1922); see note 52, 53, 54, 55 infra.
41. Hunter v. Wheate, 289 Fed. 604 (C. A. D. C. 1923).
42. Goldnamer v. O'Brien 98 Ky. 569, 86 L. R. A. 715, 32 S. W.
831, 56 Am. St. Rep. 378 (1896). This case is approved in Bigelow
on Torts p. 41.
43. Waclaw Szadiwicz v. Cantor. 154 N. E. 251 (Mass. 1926).
44. Larocque v. Conheim, 42 Misc. 613, 87 N. v. S. 625 (1904).
45. Hancock v. Htullett, 203 Ala. 272, 812 So. 552 (1919).
46. Martin v. Hardesty, 163 N. W. 610, (Ind. 1928), but see
Courtney v. Clinton 18 Ind. App. 620, 48 N. E. 799 (1897).
47. Lerbo v. Donnell, 116 Mt. 505, 101 Atl. 469 (1917).
48. Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 144 N. R. 264. (Ohio, 1956).
49. Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis. 123, 68 N. W. 869 (1896).
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make any agreement to sacrifice his life or suffer
injury to his person, and any such agreement is
void."
In those states in which there is no penal pro-
vision prohibiting a sterilization operation by the
modern methods, the general rule of tort law
would seem to apply and the consent of the party
to submit to the operation should be a complete
shield against civil liability on the part of the oper-
ating physician, provided the operation was per-
formed without negligence.5 0
The appellate courts record accounts of a num-
ber of operations where the patient was rendered
sterile by unauthorized liberties taken by the
physician. 1 The leading English case is that of
Beatty v. Cullingworth.5 A double ovariotomy
operation was performed upon the plaintiff against
her express instructions. She was a single woman,
engaged to be married, and when she heard that
the double operation had been performed rendering
her incapable of reproducing, she broke her engage-
ment, and sued the doctor. The court practically
instructed the jury to bring in a verdict for the
defendant. The case has been most severely criti-
cized." In a similar case in this country, 4 the
plaintiff recovered on an instruction that if the
operation performed was different from the one
consented to, there could be a recovery. Where
no consent is found, the legal problem is not diffi-
cult, for as was early laid down, even though con-
sent may be found from circumstances, neverthe-
less, if an operation is performed upon a person
without the patient's consent, express or implied, it
is unlawful."
We have still another class of cases, in which
the patient has submitted to the operation, but, it
is contended, is incapable of giving legal consent;
as in the case of a minor or married woman where
the consent of the parent or guardian or spouse was
not secured. Let us suppose that a woman, in order
to remove the dread of pregnancy, goes to a physi-
cian and is sterilized without notifying her husband.
When the husband learns that the possibility of
heirship has been cut off, he brings suit against the
doctor. The few cases that have directly considered
the point as to the necessity of obtaining the hus-
band's consent56 agree that if the wife's consent is
obtained the consent of the husband is not neces-
sary, provided that she is capable of giving such
consent.5 However, two cases58 apparently assum-
ing that the husband's consent is necessary, hold
that by placing the wife in the physician's care, a
husband impliedly consents to such operations as
may be found necessary or expedient. No case has
been found which questions the right of the hus-
band to have an operation performed upon himself
without the consent of his wife, and it is difficult
to imagine upon what theory such a right could be
contested.
The recent emancipation of woman has rend-
ered the husband less a "head" of the home than he
50. American Law Institute. Restatement of Torts, No. 1, See. 75.
51. See 4~ote 40 supra.
52. Beatty v. Cullingworth, an unreported case tried before the
Queens Bench Division 1896. See note 53.
53. 44 Central Law. J. 153 (1897).
54. Cuthriel v. Protestant Hospital, an unreported Ohio case,
cited in the notes to Kinkaid on Torts, Sec. 175.
55. See note 39 supra.
56. Burroughs v. Crichton, 48 App. (D. C.) 596, 602, 4 A. L. R.
1529 (1919) and note, 1,531; Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 16, 170,
14 Am St. Rep. 540, 2 L. R. A. 587 (1889).
57. Pratt v. Davis, note 40 supra. Burroughs v. Crichton, note
37 supra.
58. MeClallan v. Adams, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 855, 31 Am, Dec. 140
(1857); Pratt v. Davis, Note 40 supr,
was in years past, but certainly it has not reached
the point of making him less than her equal in con-
templation of law, and if the husband's consent is
not necessary for an operation on the wife, her con-
sent should not be necessary for an operation upon
him.
Suppose that a boy or girl in the early teens
visits a physician and solicits him to perform an
operation, and the physician does so all unknown
to the patient's parents who might have been easily
notified. The operation is performed with due care.
The child, the only male child, has been sterilized,
and the father or child, through the father, brings
suit against the doctor. The cases would seem to
indicate that recovery will be granted independent
of negligence where the parent's consent was not
obtained 0 unless the factual situation presents a
clear case of emergency tt or, in some cases at least,
the operation could be deemed a necessity under the
laws of the state allowing minors to contract for
necessaries. 6' This general requirement of consent
is based on the theory that an operation given with-
out consent is an assault, and that a minor like an
incompetent, can only give consent through his
parent or guardian. t" In this enlightened age the
obvious difference between the case of the married
woman and the case of the minor needs little ex-
planation."
Suppose before marriage a wife is sterilized by
a private operation, and does not disclose the fact
to her husband at the time of the marriage. He
petitions for an annulment on the ground of fraud
in the marriage contract. In the only case which
can be found in point 4 the court granted the annul-
ment on the ground of fraud, saying:
"Some women are congenitally, and others traumatic-
ally barren. The former may never discover the fact until
after a fruit'less mariage. But when a woman knows that
she has been made barren by a surgical operation she is
under a legal duty to disclose the fact to an intended hus-
band, so that, if he then marries her, -he will be consenting
to the situation that will frustrate his natural hope of pos-
terity, and he would not 'be heard to repudiate the marriage,
which his conduct has rendered unavoidable, although if his
knowledge had been acquired subsequent to the ceremony
he could have avoided it."
Suppose the sterilization operation were per-
formed the day following the marriage. This would
not constitute a ground for divorce even in those
states which recognize merely impotency as a
ground, for as has been pointed out, 5 impotency
imports a total want of the power of copulation and
only as necessarily incident thereto a want of con-
ceptive power.
With the rapidly increasing interest in this gen-
eral subject and the great prevalence of sterilization
operations we may well expect that more of these
problems will soon find their way into the courts.
In the meantime, this brief analysis is offered to
suggest the nature of the liability of physicians
working in this field.
59. Moss v. Rishworth, 191 S. W. 843 (Tex. 1917), affirmed 222
S. W. 555 (1920). See Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. V'a. 568, 111
S. E. 490 (1922).
60. Luka v. Lowrie, 170 Mich. 122, 156 N. W. 1106, 41 L. R. A.
(NS) 290 (1912) at 155. See also Browning v. Hoffman, nt 59 supra.
61. Bishop v. Shurley, 211 N. W. 75, (Mich. 1926).
62. Moss v. Rishworth, Note 59 supra.
62. See Burroughs v. Crichton, supra note 48, and comment at
4 A. L. R. 1533.
64. Turner v. Avery, 92 N. J. Eq. 472, 113 Atl. 710 (1921).
65, See note 20 supra.
